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AI-MEICA'S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT-IS THE NEPA
A CHANGE FOR THE BETIR?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Gross National Product (GNP)' has traditionally been one of the most
significant indices of national well-being. In the United States last year, this
leading indicator reached the unprecedented level of one trillion dollars.! In
stark contrast, the Task Force on Noise Control recently noted after three
years of study that noise in New York City, the economic and financial center
of the nation, had "'reached a level intense, continuous and persistent enough
to threaten basic community life.' ,r3 To be sure, the problem is in no sense
limited to noise nor localized in any one area.
This incongruity can perhaps best be explained in terms of misplaced priori-
ties in -the economic system, a system stressing "objects" while "[human
values and aspirations [are] submerged in programs and numbers, and the
issues tend to become quantitative and objective."6 The devastating environ-
mental impact of these traditional national policies, designed primarily to
"enhance the production of goods and to increase the [GNP]"T has become
1. Boulding, Fun and Games with the Gross National Product-The Role of Misleading
Indicators in Social Policy, in The Environmental Crisis 157 (H. Helfrich ed. 1970); Jackson,
Foreword: Environmental Quality, The Courts, and the Congress, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1073
(1970). The gross national product is basically a measure of the value of an economy's
total current output of goods and services. G. Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory 28 (1967).
2. The actual figure has been reported as $1,072,900,000,000. 52 Survey of Current Business
No. 2, at S-1 (1972).
3. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1970, at 47, col. 5.
4. See 1970 Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality [hereinafter cited
as Annual Report]; F. Grad, Environmental Law (1971) [hereinafter cited as Grad]. See
generally L. Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society (1970); G. Laycock,
The Diligent Destroyers (1970); G. Leinwand, Air and Water Pollution (1969); Advances
in Environmental Science and Technology (J. Pitts & R. Metcalf eds. 1971); R. Revelle
& H. Landsberg, America's Changing Environment (1970).
5. Annual Report 12.
6. Jackson, Environmental Policy and the Congress, 11 Nat Res. J. 403, 403 (1971);
see Jackson, Environmental Quality, supra note 1, at 1074.
7. S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
That the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs was fully cognizant of the en-
vironmental consequences of national policies is clearly evidenced by the Committee's detailed
statement of the type of problems the NEPA was designed to solve: "Examples of the rising
public concern over the manner in which Federal policies and activities have contributed to
environmental decay and degradation may be seen in the Santa Barbara oil well blowout;
the current controversy over the lack of an assured water supply and the impact of a
super-jet airport on the Everglades National Park; the proliferation of pesticides and other
chemicals; ... federally sponsored or aided construction activities such as highways, airports,
and other public works projects which proceed without reference to the desires and aspira-
tions of local people.
The purpose of [the NEPA] is, therefore, to establish a national policy designed to cope
with environmental crisis, present or impending." Id. at 8-9.
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apparent. A state now exists which dearly indicates that "the real measure of
economic welfare is not [the GNP]. It is the state or condition of the person,
or of the society."18 Although these traditional policies were not intended to
have such adverse environmental side effects, neither were they specifically de-
signed to prevent them 9 Thus, traditional economic indices, spawned in relative
ignorance of the overall societal impact of the condition of the environment,
can no longer validly attach as the sole measure of national achievement.10
There must be a shifting of emphasis from the economic system as an entity
unto itself to the eco-system as an integrated whole.,
II. THE TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
Set against this background of national economic determination, environ-
mental protection was, until very recently, obtained, if at all, primarily through
the vehicle of private litigation.' 2 Emphasis was placed on the areas of nui-
sance and trespass, with other actions based on inverse condemnation or breach
of a local ordinance.' 3 But the effectiveness of each of these ostensible remedies
is impaired by its individual idiosyncracies, as well as the more general defi-
ciencies inherent in the nature of both the remedy and our environment.
Nuisance involves "an [unreasonable] interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of land."' 4 As such it has been a tool of the environmental litigator from
an early date.'8 However, unless the plaintiff can show damages different from
8. Boulding, supra note 1, at 161.
9. Senate Report 5.
10. Jackson, supra note 6, at 403.
11. Senator Edmund Muskie (D. Me.) has noted that "environmental quality must
assume a priority equal to that of our other basic goals . . . ." Muskie, Foreword to Sym-
posium: Law and the Environment, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 663 (1970). That the focus of
attention has indeed shifted is evidenced by the proliferation of material now in print on
the general topic of ecology. Textbooks include: Grad, supra note 4; 0. Gray, Cases and
Materials on Environmental Law (1971); L. Jaffe & L. Tribe, Environmental Protection
(1971); N. Landau & P. Rheingold, The Environmental Law Handbook (1971); J. Sax,
Defending the Environment (1971). One of the most helpful collections of materials may
be found in U.S. Dep't of HUD, Environment and the Community: An Annotated Biblio-
graphy (1971).
12. See Grad & Rockett, Environmental Litigation-Where the Action Is?, 10 Nat. Res.
J. 742, 743-46 (1970); Rheingold, A Primer on Environmental Litigation, 38 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 113, 114 (1971); Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and
Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 Wayne L. Rev. 1085, 1087 (1970); Note, Legal
Aspects of Air Pollution Control in Ohio 1971: Critique and Proposals, 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev.
511, 511 (1971). See generally Brecher, Environmental Litigation: Strengths and Weaknesses,
1 Env. Affairs 565 (1971).
13. Recently the focus of private attempts to deal with environmental problems has been
on the use of statutes, ordinances and administrative rulings. Comment, Equity and the
Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clean the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254, 1258 (1970); Comment,
A History of Federal Air Pollution Control, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 516, 516-19 (1971).
14. W. Prosser, Torts § 89, at 591 (4th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
15. E.g., William Alfred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K. B. 1611), construed in Juergens-
meyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 Duke L.J.
1126, 1130.
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those suffered by the general public (which of course encompasses the majority
of large scale pollution problems), the court will deem it to be a public nui-
sance, a classification which may be fatal to a private action.1 0 This barrier
notwithstanding, many courts have held that activities conducted in conformity
with local zoning ordinances are presumptively not nuisances.'1 The courts
also tend -to use a "balancing of equities" test which weighs the plaintiff's right
itself or the extent of his damages against the benefit and needs of the com-
munity at large.' 8 In effect, the test establishes a right to pollute to a reason-
able extent.
Trespass deals with the unauthorized invasion of one's interest in the exclu-
sive possession of land,'9 and as such avoids the balancing test applicable to
nuisance actions. 0 But pollution as a form of trespass may pose unique prob-
lems for a party attempting to prove an invasion. If there is no tangible or
visible invasion as some courts require, -' the plaintiff may be out of court with-
out further ado. Other courts have adopted a more contemporary standard and
will find trespass "whether [the) intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces
of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical lan-
guage of the physicist."'2 Few courts, however, have adopted this approach.
Noise, clearly a form of environmental pollution,2 has been deemed a form
of inverse condemnation-a taking of land in the constitutional sense.24 But
16. Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 89, 90-91, 180
N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 6 N.Y.2d 900, 160 N.E.2d 926, 190 N.Y.2d
708 (1959). See also Prosser, supra note 14, at § 88, at 586-87.
17. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Sawyer v. Davis, 136
Mass. 239 (1884); Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229
(4th Dep't 1932).
18. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 NX.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312 (1970), noted in 39 Fordham L. Rev. 338 (1970). In Boomer the court, with its talk
of balancing equities, set a new standard by allowing a one-time payment for substantial
damages, at least where a defendant has used every available means of abatement. Id. at
225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The decision has been widely criticized (e.g.,
Cass, Judicially Licensed Pollution: Condemnation of Private Property for Private Use,
1970 Wash. U.L.Q. 367, 369-70; 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 917 (1970)), but it is the current state
of New York law. See Diamond v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 854, 858,
324 N.Y.S.2d 658, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Diamond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 75, 79,
316 N.Y.S. 2d 734, 738 (Sup. Ct 1970). See generally Comment, Equity and the Eco-
System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254 (1970).
19. Prosser, supra note 14, at § 13, at 68.
20. Id. § 89, at 596.
21. E.g., Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash.), afi'd per
curiam, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert denied, 352 US. 968 (1957); Waschak v.
Moffatt, 379 Pa. 41, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem Co, 92 W. Va. 445,
115 S.E. 451 (1922).
22. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 94, 342 Pad 790, 794 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 US. 918 (1960) (minute dust particles). See also Fairview Farms, Inc. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959); Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
251 Ore. 239, 445 P2d 481 (1968); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Te. 26, 344
S.W.2d 411 (1961).
23. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
24. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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the application of a remedy has generally been restricted to airport situations
where the taker is a government or governmental agency and the plaintiff suf-
fers an unreasonable, direct overflight of his property.25 Although airports
clearly pose a noise problem, the limited scope of this remedy would seem to
render it of little import in controlling overall environmental quality.
Many local environmental ordinances have been invalidated on grounds of
federal preemption; 26 others have been rendered ineffectual through a lack
of consistent enforcement or the absence of penalties sufficient to operate as a
deterrent.2 Additionally, in the past private litigation based on environmental
legislation had offered no salutary results as many statutes specifically denied
such action.28 Courts, too, have been reluctant to act. Where the nuisance was
a by-product of a public interest activity, courts precluded any injunctive re-
lief.2 The use of qui tam actions-basically an action brought by a private
citizen against another private citizen to collect a portion of a penalty for the
violation of some statute-has proven to be of little value in controlling en-
vironmental quality,80 even where expressly authorized by statute.81
25. See Note, Airport Noise, Property Rights and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev.
1428, 1437-47 (1965). But see State v. Board of Educ., 3 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1159 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1971), where the court awarded a considerable sum for damages from noise after
a portion of land adjacent to a school was condemned for a highway. But cf. Dennison v.
State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968).
26. E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969) (town ordinance
seeking to limit air activity); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750
(D.N.J. 1958); People v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 268 Cal. App. 2d 501, 74 Cal. Rptr. 222
(Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal
Pre-Emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1294 (1970).
27. See Hilderbrand, Urban Noise Control, 4 Colum. J.L. & S.P. 105 (1968). See also
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
28. E.g., N.Y. Air Pollution Control Law, Pub. Health Law §§ 1264-98 (McKinney 1971).
The statute reads in part: "Nothing in this article shall abridge or alter rights of action or
remedies ... [nor estop] individuals . . . from the exercise of their . . . rights to suppress
nuisances or to prevent or abate air pollution or air contamination." Id. § 1294. Cf. United
States v. Republic Steel Co., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. Interlake Steel Corp.,
297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. III. 1969).
29. E.g., East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 246 P.2d 554
(1952); Hannum v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 31 A.2d 99 (1943); Powell v. Superior Portland
Cement, Inc., 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942) (en banc).
30. Kafin & Needleman, The Use of Qui Tam Actions to Protect the Environment, 17
N.Y.L. Forum 130 (1971), citing inter alla Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y of America v.
United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (D. Ala.) (per curiam), aff'd per cu iam, 447
F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (ED. Wis.
1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of America v. United States Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Durning v. ITT Rayoner, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
31. E.g., N.Y. C.P..R. § 7203(a) (McKinney 1963). The statute provides, "Where a
penalty or forfeiture is given by statute to any person, an action to recover It may be main-
tained by any person in his own name... ." Id.
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Generally speaking, there are several factors which militate against the use
of private remedies as an efficient vehicle for the preservation of our environ-
ment. First, the agglomerative nature of most pollution problems poses a major
technical difficulty in developing a case,na particularly in the urban setting where
it is most unlikely that any one defendant is solely at fault.P This can prove
to be particularly troublesome not only from a legal standpoint, but also in
a physiological framework due to the synergistic interaction of various factorsP
Second, it is important to note that the private remedies are tied to the use
and enjoyment of one's land and, as such, are poorly adapted to meet the needs
of by far the greatest segment of any urban community, e.g., commuters, visi-
tors and residents in transit. Cost, a third factor, can be a major deterrent to
private action.3 5 Even where a class action is allowed, the cost of maintaining
a successful action against an affluent corporate defendant may be prohibitive.38
A fourth defect inherent in private actions is their basically remedial nature. 7
In most situations an action will be brought only after the investment of sub-
stantial sums of money has become a fait accompli.38 Thus, many authorities
agree that the main assault on presently existing sources of pollution, if it is
to be effective, must create positive incentives for expenditures incurred pur-
suant to abatement.89 Finally, even when a private action is successful, its main
effect is by definition personal, with merely incidental and unsystematic effects
on overall environmental protection.40
32. See, e.g., Note, Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control in Ohio 1971: Critique and
Proposals, 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 511, 518-23 (1971).
33. Bonau v. Sarni, 2 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1484, 1485 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1971); Note, supra
note 32, at 519-22.
34. Pollutants and weather may interact in a manner such that "the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts, with interactions between particles and gasses, pollutants, and
weather. . . ." Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implications for
Control, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 197, 214 (1968).
35. Brecher, Environmental Litigation: Strengths and Weaknesses 1 Env. Affairs 565,
568 (1971).
36. The expense involved is great even when the burden is spread among many persons
through the employment of a class action. Brecher, supra note 35, at 569. Moreover, the
procedural aspects of class actions pose threshold problems for the would-be litigant. Note,
The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 383, 384 (1959).
37. See text accompanying notes 12-32 supra.
38. Brecher supra note 35, at 569.
39. Suggested incentives include tax credits or deductions, federal grants in aid and
federal contracts. See, e.g., Kramon, Noise Control: Traditional Remedies and a Propal
for Federal Action, 7 Harv. 3. Legis. 533, 550-56 (1970); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970). But see Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A
National Solution to Water Pollution, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1527, 1532-36 (1970); Comment,
supra note 18, at 1258.
40. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E2d 870, 309 N.YS.2d
312 (1970), noted in 39 Fordham L. Rev. 338 (1970); Brecher supra note 35, at 570.
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III. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH
Substantial though these issues41 are, they are for the most part procedural.
A substantive and perhaps more conclusive argument weighing against the use
of private common law remedies in contemporary environmental litigation ema-
nates from the complexity of the eco-system. These complexities necessitate
analysis as a complex whole using "systems approach" of the space and defense
programs.2 Any efficacious program will demand "overall planning, not pos-
sible in a case by case approach, and a greater degree of expertise than that
which obtains in the courts. ' 43 An integrated, federal systems approach to en-
vironmental protection would seem to be a most urgent priority.44 "If we are
to survive, we need to become aware of the damaging effects of technological
innovations, determine their economic and social costs, balance these against
the expected benefits, make the facts broadly available to the public, and
take the action needed to achieve an acceptable balance of benefits and haz-
ards."'45 As the actions of virtually all federal agencies have some effect on the
condition of the environment,48 it is of paramount importance that these agen-
cies "have a mandate, a body of law, or a set of policies to guide [such] ac-
tions .... 147
41. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
42. Mayda, Conservation, New Conservation and Eco-management, 1969 WIS. L. Rev.
788, 793 (1969).
43. Grad & Rockett, Environmental Litigation-Where the Action Is?, 10 Nat. Res. J.
742, 744 (1970). In Boomer the court noted that the "judicial establishment is neither
equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down
and implement an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution." 26 N.Y.2d at 223,
257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314. See note 202 infra and accompanying text.
44. See Annual Report, supra note 1, at 232. "It is the function of the law to provide
for the establishment of administratively sound and workable institutions capable of carry-
ing on the functions of environmental management across jurisdictional lines, as well as to
coordinate the functions of different agencies . . . for better environmental management."
Grad, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 1-20.
45. B. Commoner, Science and Survival 122-23 (1967).
46. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 9. See generally J. Sax, Defending the Environment
(1971).
47. Senate Report 9; The report also noted that: "As a result of [past] failure to
formulate a comprehensive national policy, environmental decisionmaking largely continues
to proceed as it has in the past. Policy is established by default and inaction. Environmental
problems are only dealt with when they reach crisis proportions. Public desires and aspira-
tions are seldom consulted. Important decisions concerning the use and the shape of man's
future environment continue to be made in small but steady increments which perpetuate
rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous decades.
Today it is clear that we cannot continue on this course. Our natural resources-our air,
water, and land-are not unlimited. We no longer have the margins for error that we once
enjoyed. The ultimate issue posed by shortsighted, conflicting, and often selfish demands
and pressures upon the finite resources of the earth are clear." Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
But there are some factors working to replenish and increase other available supplies of
natural resources. Address by 3. E. S. Fawcett, David Davies Memorial Institute of Inter-
national Studies, at 7, June 1970.
IV. Tm NEPA
Prior to the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) 45 federal agencies were not required to cope with the broad environ-
mental impact of their actions; in fact, they generally lacked statutory authority
to deal with these matters on any comprehensive basis. 49 As a result, Title 1
of the NEPA50 is prefaced by a congressional declaration of purpose" ' setting
forth the broad goal of the Act; to "declare a national policy which will en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment .... " 52 The statutory authority to evaluate environmental impact was pro-
vided by the NEPA's mandate to all federal agencies and officials to "develop
methods and procedures ... which will ensure that... environmental amenities
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking .... 25
Section 101 of the NEPA r5 a declaration of the Act's substantive policy,
requires that the federal government use "all practicable means... to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony .... "55 While the Act does not provide for environmental protection
as an exclusive national goal, it was intended that there be a reordering of
national priorities to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach . . . in
planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environ-
ment," 56 to assure that environmental considerations assume their proper place.ar
Contrasted with the broad mandate of section 101 are the rigid procedural
provisions of section 102, 58 which establish "action-forcing" procedures de-
48. Act of Jan. 1, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852-56 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-47 (1970)).
49. In New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U. . 962 (1969),
the court affirmed the Commission's contention that it had no authority to consider non-
radiological environmental effects, stating that "in enacting the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946
and 1954 . . . the Congress [had] viewed the responsibility of the Commission as being
confined to scrutiny of and protection against hazards from radiation." Id. at 175.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (1970).
51. Id. § 4321.
52. Id. The report accompanying the original bill noted that: "The purposes of the act
are to declare a national environmental policy; to promote efforts to prevent environ-
mental damage and to better the health and welfare of man; to enlarge and enrich man's
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation ...
Senate Report, supra note 7, at 17.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (B) (1970). As Senator Jackson (D. Wash.) put it, the Act would
require all federal agencies and officials to consider "the consequences of their actions on the
environment" Senate Report 14.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
55. Id. § 4331(a).
56. Id. § 4332(2)(A). "A statement of environmental policy is more than a statement
of what we believe as a people and as a nation. It establishes priorities and gives expression
to our national goals and aspirations." 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Jackson).
57. 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The section provides in part: "The Congress authorizes
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signed to insure implementation of the policy enunciated in section 101.5D "[S]ec-
tion 102 authorizes and directs that the existing body of Federal law, regula-
tion, and policy be interpreted and administered to the fullest extent possible
in accordance with the policies set forth in [the NEPA].'.O As one commen-
tator has pointed out, this standard does not give federal agencies any discre-
tion regarding compliance with the substantive and procedural duties imposed.01
Where implementation of the policy set forth in the Act is possible, section
102 not only allows but requires that agencies comply unless precluded from
doing so by existing law. 2 Any other interpretation would reduce the provl-
sions of section 101 to no more than lofty declarations.63
Clarifying the extent of environmental consideration required by the Act,
sections 102(2) (A) 0 4 and (B) 65 provide, in essence, that wherever the plan-
ning or decisions of a federal agency might affect the environment, that agency
should, to the "fullest extent possible," consider all relevant views in planning
those activities-including environmental values-and make a concerted effort
to "incorporate those values in official planning and dedsionmaking."10 As
environmental values will frequently conflict with economic and technical con-
siderations, the NEPA is unwavering in its insistance "that all relevant envir-
onmental values and amenities [be] considered in the calculus of project
development and decisionmaking." 67
In order to ensure that the desired balancing process is effected in accordance
and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws
of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shal-(A) utilize
a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural
and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decislonmaking
which may have an impact on man's environment... 11
59. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 19. Senator Jackson, a primary sponsor of the NEPA,
stated that the Act "... directs all agencies to assure consideration of the environmental
impact of their actions in decisionmaking." 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969).
60. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
61. Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1
Env. L. Rep. 50035, 50037 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Peterson].
62. By inserting the "to the fullest extent possible" provision, Congress made it clear
that "each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in
[the NEPAl unless the existing law applicable to such agency's operations does not make
compliance possible." 115 Cong. Rec. 40418 (1969) (major changes passed by the Senate).
The Act further provided against this contingency by requiring all agencies to notify the
President of any such inconsistencies, including proposed changes, not later than July 1,
1971. 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970).
63. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
65. Id. § 4332(2) (B).
66. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 20.
67. 115 Cong. Rec. 29055 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). Although it is clear that
a balancing process is required, one commentator has observed that "[w]hat constitutes
'appropriate consideration' of these factors is a difficult question." Peterson, supra note
61, at 50041.
with the dictates of sections 102(2) (A) and (B), section 102(2)(C) s requires
that a "detailed statement" be prepared by the appropriate agency whenever
legislative proposals or other major federal action is involved. This statement,
in order to facilitate the agency's decisionmaking process and to provide other
agencies and the public with information concerning the consequences of planned
federal actions,6 9 should explore the environmental impact of the proposed ac-
tion and, when adverse impact is found to be a possibility, propose alterna-
tive methods of implementing the proposal ° Section 102(2) (D), requiring
federal agencies and officials to "study, develop, and describe appropriate alter-
natives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves un-
resolved co~fficts concerning alternative uses of available resources,",' suggests
that this consideration of possible alternatives must be equally as extensive
as the consideration of environmental impact.7 2 Only when the total picture is
thoughtfully viewed can the most intelligent, salutary decision be made.
Section 104 of the NEPA73 was enacted to ensure that 1... no agency may
substitute the procedures outlined in [the NEPA] for more restrictive and
specific procedures established by law governing its activities.!' 4 It has been
further stated that the section was intended to provide for the use of NEPA
procedures "where there is no more effective procedure already established
.... 75 A paucity of legislative history hinders conclusive interpretation, but
it would appear that this section was adopted as a compromise measure to in-
sure that the NEPA would not undercut the more specific standards of the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (WQIA).70
Section 202 of the NEPA establishes the Council on Environmental Quality
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
69. See 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). As Senator Jac lon
put it, decisions adversely affecting the environment are to be made "in the light of public
scrutiny." Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
71. Id. § 4332(2) (D).
72. Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmental Control: Admini trative
Reform on the Executive Level, 1 Env. Affairs 299, 310 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dono-
van]; Peterson, supra note 61, at 50039; see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 3 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970).
74. 115 Cong. Rec. 40420 (1969) (section-by-section analysis).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 29053 (remarks of Senator Muskie). The WQIA is codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-75 (1970). Basically it is designed to "enhance the quality and value of our water
resources ... .. Id. § 11l(a). Certification is required where activities will have an impact
on our water resources. Id. § 1171. Senator Jackson, however, seemed to feel that there was
no need for a compromise. This thinking is evidenced by his statement: "It is my under-
standing that there was never any conflict between LWQIA] and the provisions of ENEPAl.
If both bills were enacted in their present form, there would be a requirement for State
certification, as well as a requirement that the licensing agency make environmental findings!'
115 Cong. Rec. 29053 (1969).
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(CEQ) within the Executive Office of the President.77 The three members of
the Council are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure.78 The
duties of the Council include the provision of assistance to the President in
the study, appraisal and evaluation of current and prospective environmental
trends and their inter-relationship with present federal actions and programs
as well as future legislation to promote the improvement of environmental qual-
ityY9 The Council's effectiveness in carrying out these functions will be ana-
lyzed in some depth later in this comment.80
V. NEPA iN Tim COURTS
A. Standing to Sue
Although the NEPA has been in effect for a relatively short period of time,
many questions have already been raised which can be resolved only through
judicial interpretation.81 As there is no express provision in the NEPA on
standing, this issue quickly became the focus of litigation in several actions.
Procedurally, standing to sue in a federal court emanates from the "case or
controversy" clause of the Constitution.82 Substantively, this restriction oper-
ates in our adversary system to guarantee that "only those with a genuine and
legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding ... ."1 Where such an in-
terest attaches, reason the courts, there will be a greater likelihood of developing
that degree of "adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues .... ,,84
All suits are subject to the standing requirements; 85 however, it is primarily in
public interest actions that the issue arises.
Traditionally the test for standing was rather restrictive, requiring an actual
injury to some legally protected interest.86 Recently the law of standing has
undergone significant re-evaluation the result of which, unfortunately, has been
considerable confusion.87 The liberalization of standing requirements was largely
effected through the decision in Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp.88 In that case the plaintiffs commenced an action challeng-
77. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 4344. See text accompanying notes 206-18 infra.
80. See text accompanying notes 213-26 infra.
81. Donovan, supra note 72, at 322.
82. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-55 (1970).
83. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911); In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255 ((C.C.N.D. Cal.) 1887).
84. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
85. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See generally Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 469 (1970).
86. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v.
Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938). See generally Ahlgren, The Law of Standing in the Federal
Courts: Protecting the Environment, 5 Clearinghouse Rev. 570 (1972).
87. Ahlgren, supra note 86, at 571-73.
88. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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ing a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency under the National Bank Act.82
Fashioning a new, two-pronged test, the Court found that standing would be
granted where a plaintiff's interest was "arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion,'"90 and he "alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in
fact .... ."9 The Court went on to say that the injury need not be economic,
and could reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational... values."32 Al-
though this test embodied a far more liberal standard than that which had pre-
viously obtained, its application in environmental litigation has produced widely
divergent results.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,0 the plaintiffs alleged a
general biological harm to man through the continued use of DDTY4 Reason-
ing that DDT's harmful properties would affect all people in a similar manner,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs were members of a class of persons who
would be injured in fact. 5 The zone of interest doctrine has evolved through
two schools of thought; the first enunciates a narrow interpretation limited
to those requirements specifically dealt with by the statute; the other a broad
interpretation encompassing the total benefit, value or advantage contemplated
by the Congress? 6 In Hardin the court adopted the broad interpretation, noting
that the statuteP7 involved addressed not only the economic interests of regis-
trants, but also the public safety?8 Other courts have shown their approval of
this liberal standard, one noting that "'if the statutes involved in the contro-
versy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic, and scenic resources,
then a congressional intent exists to give standing to groups interested in these
factors .. . ,99
Sierra Club v. Morton'0 0 presented the Court with an action challenging the
issuance of various licenses to Walt Disney Productions for the construction
of a ski resort in Sequoia National Park.'0 Adopting a very restrictive view
of the Camp test, the Court noted that the "'injury in fact' test requires more
than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review
89. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 108, 13 Stat. 101, codified as amended, 12 US.C. § 24
(1970).
90. 397 U.S. at 153.
91. Id. at 152.
92. Id. at 154 (citation omitted).
93. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
94. Id. at 1096.
95. Id. at 1096-97.
96. Comment, Conservationist's Standing to Challenge the Actions of Federal Agencies,
1 Ecology L.Q. 305, 320-21 (1971). See also Davis, supra note 85, at 455-56.
97. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970).
98. 428 F.2d at 1095-96.
99. Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 31S F. Supp. 238, 245 (M.D.
Pa. 1970), quoting Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1033, 1092
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 949 (1970).
1OO. 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), aff'g 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
101. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4398.
1972] NEPA
908 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
be himself among the injured."'1 0 2 While a broadening of the categories of injury
available as a basis for standing met with the Court's approval,10  it refused to
abandon the "requirement that the party seeking review must have himself suf-
fered an injury." 4 It was in these terms that the Court recognized Hardin's
irreconcilability with this decision.' 05 One commentator has attributed the denial
of standing to the considerable interest in the completion of the project on a
local level as compared with the opposition of the nationally oriented Sierra
Club; 106 others have suggested that the Court was unwilling to open the flood-
gates to such action.' 07 Justice Blackmun was highly critical of this rationale
for limiting participation in environmental litigation, 0 8 noting that "courts will
exercise appropriate restraints just as they have exercised them in the past."' 00
The Morton decision has done little to clear the air on the issue of standing to
sue." 0 Moreover, the Court declined to give any view on the merits of the com-
plaint."' It is encouraging to note, however, that in Morton there was no alleged
violation of the NEPA. To date, no suit alleging non-compliance with NEPA
provisions has been dismissed for want of standing.112 This can be interpreted as
an indication that courts narrowly construing Camp will justify standing through
strict application of the procedural requirements of the Act," 8 and that more
102. Id. at 4400. The Sierra Club had failed to allege that it or any of its members would
be injured by the Disney development. Id.
103. Id. at 4401.
104. Id.
105. Id. See also Comment, supra note 96, at 311. But see 40 U.S.L.W. at 4401 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting), where Justice Blackmun expressed his belief that decisions such as
Hardin were of greater merit, citing thirteen cases in which other courts found that justice
was better served by "an imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing. ,.
Id. at 4405.
106. Peterson, supra note 61, at 50047-48. See also 40 U.S.L.W. at 4405 (Douglas, J,
dissenting). justice Douglas suggested that environmental issues should be litigated in the
name of the inanimate object in question. Id. at 4402; see Stone, Should Trees Have Stand-
ing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972).
107. Comment, supra note 103, at 594 (1971); Comment, Standing in the Ninth Circuit,
1 Env. L. Rptr. 10058, 10059 (1971). But the comments point out that not only would the
amount of time and effort spent on this issue be a significant portion of the time required
for a hearing on the merits, 11 Nat. Res. J. at 594, but also that by allowing class actions
the court could eliminate any threat of harassment. 1 Env. L. Rptr. at 10059, citing Sierra
Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971). See also 40 U.S.L.W. at 4407 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
108. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4407 (dissenting opinion).
109. Id.
110. See notes 100-09 supra and accompanying text.
111. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4402. The Court affirmed the lower court decision that the Sierra Club
lacked standing to sue. Id.
112. Peterson, supra note 61, at 50047. For a comprehensive listing of all such cases see
id. at 50046 n.68.
113. E.g., Lathan v. Volpe, 3 Env. Rptr.--Cases 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1971); see text
accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
liberal courts will likewise do so by additionally looking to the broad underly-
ing environmental policy of the Act.114
B. Judicially Enforceable Duties
Another question of primary importance to the prospective impact of the
NEPA is whether or not the Act creates any legally cognizable duties. In light
of the provisions of section 102, 1r it would appear that there is a clear proce-
dural duty to consider environmental impact and to prepare a detailed state-
ment. However, there has been one court which has indicated to the contrary.
In Bucklein v. Volpe, " the district court was faced with a taxpayers' class
action under the NEPA to enjoin the Secretary of Transportation from com-
mitting emergency relief funds for road repair.117 Plaintiffs claimed that the
county board had abused its discretionary powers when it certified that the
proposed road relocation would be environmentally sound." 8 While holding
that the board's action was proper, the court stated in dictum:
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the Environmental Policy Act can serve as the
basis for a cause of action..., the Act is simply a declaration of congressional policy;
as such, it would seem not to create any rights or impose any duties of which a court
can take cognizance. There is only the general command to federal officials to use
all practicable means to enhance the environment." 9
This dictum would seem to stand in direct conflict with the legislative intent,'"
which the court did not discuss at all.
More recently, the district court in Ely v. Vdde' "- considered a request for
a permanent injunction against the construction of a penal institution in a his-
torically unique area. The project was to be financed in part by federal funds
granted under the Safe Streets Act In approving the grant, the federal Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration concededly did not consider the envir-
onmental effect of the proposed construction?" Plaintiffs alleged that this gave
rise to a violation of section 102 (2) (C) (i) of the NEPA . 4 The Ely court, in
114. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) ; see notes 58-72 supra and accompanying text.
116. 2 Env. Rptr.--Cases 1082 (NfD. Cal. 1970).
117. Id. The funds were to be allocated from an emergency relief road repair fund under
23 U.S.C. § 125 (1970).
118. 2 Env. Rptr.-Cases at 1082. The plaintiff alleged that the board and the Secretary
of Transportation had failed to adequately evaluate environmental factors. Id.
119. Id. at 1083.
120. See notes 58-72 supra and accompanying text.
121. 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-95 (1970). The Act provides that "[tlhe Administration [LEAA]
shall make grants under this chapter to a State planning agency if such agency has on fiL-
with the Administration an approved comprehensive State plan (not more than one year in
age) which conforms with the purposes and requirements of this chapter." Id. § 3733.
123. 321 F. Supp. at 1090.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (i) (1970). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants could have
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contrast to the construction given the Act in Bucklein, held that the interests
sought to be protected by the plaintiffs were within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the statute.125 However, the court narrowed this construction of the
Act, holding that "while the Congress did not intend the clause . . . 'to the
fullest extent possible,' to be an escape provision [for agency compliance], it
is still discretionary."' 26 At least one commentator has noted that the court
apparently did not understand the language of the section as viewed in the
context of the clear legislative intent to bring about a "reordering of national
priorities."'1'
In Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States, 28 plaintiffs
brought an action to block the disbursement and spending of a Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) loan earmarked for the construction of a golf course in the
virgin timber of a state park in Texas. Plaintiffs argued that the FHA's failure
to file a "detailed statement" concerning the effects of the proposed golf course
on the park's eco-system violated section 102(2) (C) of the NEPA.129 Defen-
dants contended that the requirements of this section-one of which is the duty
to confer with other agencies having jurisdiction over the environmental impact
involved' 3 0-were not mandatory. The court rejected this contention, noting
that compliance is clearly required as "[i]t is hard to imagine a clearer or
stronger mandate to the Courts." 13 ' Therefore, it would appear that the Ely
court's classification of the duties imposed by the NEPA as discretionary'8 2
was unequivocally rejected in Texas Committee.0 8
C. Calvert Cliffs'
In view of the contradictions manifested by prior decisions, a thorough ju-
dicial review of the NEPA which could serve as a guideline for the implementa-
tion of congressional intent was needed.' 34 The void was partially filled by
chosen a more appropriate site. 321 F. Supp. at 1091. See also note 70 supra and accompany-
ing text.
125. 321 F. Supp. at 1092.
126. Id. at 1093 (footnote omitted).
127. Donovan, supra note 72, at 316.
128. 1 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1303 (W.D. Tex.), vacated as moot, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1970).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
130. Id. The detailed statement required is to be made only "[alfter consultation with
and obtaining the comments of Federal and State agencies which have jurisdiction by law
with respect to any environment impact ... "' 115 Cong. Rec. 40420 (1969) (section-by-
section analysis).
131. 1 Env. Rptr.-Cases at 1304.
132. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
133. See also Lathan v. Volpe, 3 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1362 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Kalur v. Resor,
335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877
(D. Ore. 1971); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.S.D. 1971).
134. The only circuit to interpret the Act had been the fifth in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d
199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), where the court stated: "This Act
essentially states that every federal agency shall consider ecological factors when dealing with
activities which may have an impact on man's environment." Id. at 211 (footnote omitted).
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Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Canmission,' 5 in
which the court of appeals held that "Section 102 of NEPA mandates a par-
ticular sort of careful and informed dedsionmaking process and creates judi-
dally enforceable duties."'138
In Calvert, the petitioners challenged specific portions of the AEC rules which
they contended were in violation of the requirements of section 102 of the
NEPA. 37 The first allegation was that although one of the AEC rules provided
for agency review of environmental impact of proposed projects, it did not re-
quire review of non-radiological impact unless there was an affirmative challenge
of such impact by an outside intervenor or a staff member of the Commission.u s
The rule provided that an environmental report should be submitted by an
applicant for a construction permit, but unless this report was challenged, it
would merely accompany the application through the review process without
being received into evidence. 30
Although this rule was in technical compliance with the requirement of sec-
tion 102 (2) (C) that the environmental report "accompany the proposal through
the existing agency review processes," 40 the court held that the word "accom-
pany" should not be given such a restrictive reading as to make the Act ludi-
crous3' Rather, it should be read as reflective of congressional intent that the
environmental impact be "considered through agency review processes."'' 1
Although this interpretation seems to indicate that the NEPA mandates certain duties on the
part of federal agencies, the brevity of the court's analysis weighs against the applicability
of such an interpretation.
135. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
136. Id. at 1115.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
138. 449 F.2d at 1116-17; see 10 C.F.R. § 50, at 246-50 (1971) (app. D, pt. 11(b)).
139. 449 F.2d at 1117; see 10 C.F.R. § 60, at 249 (1971) (app. D, pts. 12 & 13), which
provides:
"12. If any party to a proceeding ... raises any [environmental] issue ... the Applicant's
Environmental Report and the Detailed Statement will be offered in evidence. The atomic
safety and licensing board will make findings of fact on, and resolve, the matters in contro-
versy among the parties with regard to those issues. Depending on the resolution of thoze
issues, the permit or license may be granted, denied, or appropriately conditioned to protect
environmental values.
13. When no party to a proceeding ... raises any [environmental] issue.., such issues
will not be considered by the atomic safety and licensing board. Under such circumstances,
although the Applicant's Environmental Report, comments thereon, and the Detailed State-
ment will accompany the application through the Commission's review processes, they will
not be received in evidence, and the Commission's responsibilities under the [NEPA] will be
carried out in toto outside the hearing process." Id. App. D was substantially revised to
comport with the holding in Calvert Cliffs'. See 36 Fed. Reg. 18071-76 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg.
864 (1972).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (v) (1970).
141. 449 F.2d at 1117. See Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in
Wolf's Clothing?, 37 Brooklyn L. Rev. 139, 149-51 (1970), for an interesting comparison
of this procedure with that of the Department of Transportation.
142. 449 F2d at 1118 (footnote omitted). The court refused to allow the AEC to defer
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Petitioners further contended that the AEC's refusal to consider non-radiolog-
ical environmental factors at hearings officially noticed before March 4, 1971
violated the NEPA's provision that all environmental factors be considered by
government agencies after January 1, 1970.143 The court noted that the hearings
affected by this exclusionary regulation might continue for a year until final
action was taken, thereby allowing the Commission to take major federal actions
having an undetermined environmental impact for more than two years after
the Act's effective date without complying with the NEPA.144 In defending this
policy, the AEC relied on the alleged failure of the NEPA to enunciate detailed
guidelines and inflexible timetables for the Act's implementation, 1" as well as
the Commission's desire to provide for an orderly period of transition.1 40 The
court found these arguments particularly specious and unpersuasive, holding
that: "The absence of a 'timetable' for compliance has never been held sufficient,
in itself, to put off the date on which a congressional mandate takes effect. The
absence of a 'timetable,' rather, indicates that compliance is required forth-
with.',147
Petitioners also contested the AEC procedure precluding independent evalua-
tion and balancing of non-radiological environmental factors where the satisfac-
tion of the environmental standards of another responsible agency had been
certified.148 The AEC premised this position on section 104 of the Act which
provides:
consideration of environmental effects absent outside intervention. This conclusion is implicit
in the court's statement that the "NEPA was meant to do more than regulate the flow of
papers in the federal bureaucracy." Id. at 1117.
143. Id.; see 10 C.F.R. § 50, at 249 (1971) (app. D, pt. 11(b)), which provides in part:
"Any party to a proceeding for the issuance of a construction permit or an operating license
for a nuclear power reactor or a fuel reprocessing plant may raise as an issue in the pro-
ceeding whether the issuance of the permit or license would be likely to result in a signifi-
cant, adverse effect on the environment. If such a result were indicated, in accordance with
the declaration of national policy expressed in the [NEPAl, consideration will be given to
the need for the imposition of requirements for the preservation of environmental values
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, including the need to meet
on a timely basis the growing national requirements for electric power. The above-described
issues shall not be construed as including (a) radiological effects, since radiological effects are
considered pursuant to other provisions of this part or (b) matters of water quality covered
by section 21(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. This paragraph applies only to
proceedings in which the notice of bearing in the proceeding is published on or after
March 4, 1971." Id.
144. 449 F.2d at 1119.
145. Id. (citing brief for respondents). Reliance was also placed on the fact that nowhere
in the statute is there a bar to "'agency provisions which are designed to accommodate
transitional implementation problems.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1120.
148. Id. at 1117; see 10 C.F.R § 50, at 249 (1971) (app. D, pt. 11(b)), which provides:
"With respect to those aspects of environmental quality for which environmental quality
standards and requirements have been established by authorized Federal, State, and regional
agencies, proof that the applicant is equipped to observe and agrees to observe such standards
Nothing in section [102] ... shall in any way affect the specific statutory obliga-
tions of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental
quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3)
to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification
of any other Federal or State agency.' 49
Ironically, the AEC was arguing that while NEPA reforms do not supersede
more specific statutes, 150 the more specific statutes do emasculate the NEPA. l5
The court concluded that to read the section as the Commission proposed would
be to ignore the basic purpose and spirit of the Act.' 2 Thus the effect of the
AEC's regulation would be that NEPA procedures, "viewed by the Commis-
sion as superfluous, [would] wither away in disuse, applied only to those en-
vironmental issues wholly unregulated by any other federal, state or regional
body.' '15 In the court's view, certification by another agency would not be
dispositive of the issue of environmental damage.'" For example, the Commis-
sion stated that it would "defer totally to water quality standards devised and
administered by state agencies and approved by the federal government under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act."' s5 The court held that: "Obedience
to water quality certifications under WQIA is not mutually exclusive with the
NEPA procedures. It does not preclude performance of the NEPA duties."150
While such certification does establish "a minimum condition for the granting
of a license,' 15a it does not have to be the final word.Y8 There might still be
damage, but not of a sufficient degree to violate the standards set up by the
WQIA. 0 9 Since state certifying agencies set up under the WQIA do not attempt
to weigh possible damage against opposing benefits, the Commission's interpre-
tation would circumvent the balancing process required by the AcL1Co Clearly,
and requirements will be considered a satisfactory showing that there will not be a signifi-
cant, adverse effect on the environment. Certification by the appropriate agency that there
is reasonable assurance that the applicant for the permit or license will observe such standards
and requirements will be considered dispositive for this purpose." Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970).
150. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
151. See 449 F.2d at 1124.
152. Id. at 1123.
153. Id. at 1122-23.
154. Id. at 1123.
155. Id. at 1122 (footnote omitted); see 10 C.F.R. § 50, at 249 (1971) (app. D, pt.
11(a)). The Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970). While the AEC's rules do not
require that applicants' environmental reports and detailed statements include "a discussion
of the water quality aspects of the proposed actions," 10 C.F.R. § S0, at 248 (app. D, pt. 6)
they prevent independent consideration of such by the Commission in its review procss.
Id. at 249 (app. D, pts. 11-12). See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
156. 449 F.2d at 1125.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1123.
160. Id. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text. The fact that another agency's
standards are satisfied involves judgment of a different magnitude. "Such agencies, without
overall responsibility for the particular federal action in question, attend only to one aspect
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in the court's view, any interpretation of section 104 that would give rise to
such an omission would be in direct conflict with the overriding purpose of the
Act.16' While section 104 requires obedience to the standards set by other agen-
des, the section was not meant to authorize total abdication.10
2
Petitioners' final attack was directed against the AEC's refusal to consider
construction halts or alterations of plans for nuclear facilities for which construc-
tion permits had been granted prior to January 1, 1970-the effective date of
the NEPA-but which could not be operational until after that date.1'3 Of
course the Calvert Cliffs plant was of primary and most immediate concern in
this respect.1' While the AEC recognized that environmental measures must be
taken now in its provision for the drafting of an environmental report in ad-
vance of any operating license proceedings,' 6" it failed to provide for "any
independent action based upon the material in the environmental reports .... "100
The AEC claimed that in view of the national power crisis, the rule was as
practicable as possible.'6 The court stated, however, that the mandate to use
"'all practicable means consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy' ,168 was applicable only in regard to the substantive goals set forth in
section 101 of the Act.16 9 The procedural requirements of section 102, on the
other hand, are inflexible in their requirement of full consideration, thereby
imposing a decidedly stricter standard of compliance.' 70 The court thus con-
cluded that the AEC's deferral of consideration of environmental impact until
the operating license proceedings (at which time correctional action would in
all probability be so costly as to shift the balance) violated the intent of the
Act.17
of the problem: the magnitude of certain environmental costs. They simply determine
whether those costs exceed an allowable amount." 449 F.2d at 1123.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1124. See also Greene County v. FPC, 3 Env. Rptr.-Cascs 1595 (2d Cir.
1972); Kalur v. Resbr, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
163. 449 F.2d at 1127.
164. Id.
165. Id.; 10 C.F.R. § 50, at 247 (1971) (app. D, pt. 1): "Each holder of a permit to
construct a nuclear power reactor or a fuel reprocessing plant issued without the Detailed
Statement . .. having been prepared, who has not filed an application for an operating
license, shall submit ... an Environmental Report as soon as practicable." Id.
166. 449 F.2d at 1127.
167. Id. at 1127-28 (citing brief for respondents).
168. Id. at 1128.
169. Id. at 1128. See also notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
170. Id. See also notes 58-72 supra and accompanying text..
171. 449 F.2d at 1128. Although the projects in question might have been started prior
to January 1, 1970, the Act "clearly applies to them since they must still pass muster before
going into full operation." Id. at 1179 (footnote omitted). The Commission conceded that
such consideration did not amount to a retroactive application of the NEPA, agreeing with
the court that the two distinct phases of federal approval involved (construction and opera-
tion permits) distinguished this case. Id. & n.43. See also Environmental Defense Fund v.
TVA, 3 Env. Rptr.--Cases 1553 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). The guidelines issued by the Council on
Environmental Quality expressly urged the utilization of NEPA procedures, even when
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In regard to the four rules challenged by the petitioners, 72 the court held
that revision was necessary and that that revision should reflect "an exercise of
substantive discretion which will protect the environment 'to the fullest extent
possible.' No less is required if the grand congressional purposes underlying
NEPA are to become a reality."' 7 3
D. Beyond Calvert
Although the Calvert court unequivocally held that the NEPA requires com-
pliance with its procedural mandates, the Act by its terms requires a detailed
statement only when a federal agency is involved with "proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment ... ."17-1 Several recent cases have focused on the interpretation of
this statutory language. Sierra Club v. Hardinrlr involved a Department of
Agriculture permit for the construction of a U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers,
Inc. pulp mill in Tongass National Forest., 10 The defendants contended that
approval of a project had been given prior to January 1, 1970: "To the maximum extent
practicable the section 102(2)(C) procedure should be applied to further major Federal
actions having a significant effect on the environment even though they arise from projects
or programs initiated prior to enactment of the Act .... Where it is not practicable to
reassess the basic course of action, it is still important that further incremental major actions
be shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental consequences. It is also important in
further action that account be taken of environmental consequences not fully evaluated at
the outset of the project or program." 36 Fed. Reg. 7727 (1971) ; cf. Lathan v. Volpe, 3 Env.
Rptr.--Cases 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1971); Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387
F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 390 US. 921 (1968).
172. The court did not address the issue of retroactivity per se. One implication to be
gleaned from the court's discussion is that in determining whether to apply the NEPA
retroactively, courts should not adopt a strict position, but rather first determine if the broad
policy of the Act can be achieved through such application. Note, Retroactive Lav,-En-
vironmental Law-Retroactive Application of The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 69 ich. L. Rev. 732, 760 (1971). Other courts have taken the view that projects
approved before the effective date of the Act are covered by it since each appropriation
thereafter is an action within the contemplation of the Act. Environmental Defense Fund v.
TVA, 3 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1553 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). But see Pennsylvania Environmental Council,
Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
173. 449 F.2d at 1129.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) (emphasis added). It would appear, however, that
some actions not requiring section 102 statements may require environmental impact state-
ments under section 309 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7 (1970). See gen-
erally Comment, Section 309 of the Clean Air Act: EPA's Duty to Comment on Environmental
Impacts, 1 Env. L. Rptr. 10146, 10149 (1971). Section 309 requires that the Environmental
Protection Agency examine areas of statutory authority and make written comments on
possible environmental effects in the areas of legislation, proposed federal guidelines and new
federal construction. The EPA is to report all such possible effects to the CEQ. 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-1 (1970).
175. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
176. Id. at 102.
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this was not a major federal action, thus requiring no detailed statement.1 "
The court, relying on the same U.S. Plywood environmental study used by the
Forest Service, found that the Forest Service was justified in concluding that a
statement was unnecessary. 178 In anticipation of the CEQ's final guidelines, the
court did temper its decision by indicating that in the future such procedures
might not be acceptable. 179 Certainly even without the benefit of such guidelines
it would seem reasonable to assume that the report used to justify this result
should have been prepared by a disinterested party.
In Davis v. Morton'80 the district court was faced with a lease of restricted
Indian land approved by the Secretary of the Interior.' 8 ' The Secretary con-
tended that the action should not be considered a "major federal action."182
Noting that after the lease had been completed the statutory authority for In-
dian land leases'8 3 had been amended to require environmental consideration,
the court concluded that Congress thereby indicated that the NEPA was inap-
plicable to such actions.'8 4 Shortly after the decision, however, the CEQ issued
its guidelines to be used in classifying major federal actions requiring environ-
mental statements; the list includes any actions "involving a Federal lease,
permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use .... "1185 Clearly the con-
clusion of the CEQ was contrary to the interpretation given by the Davis court.
The guidelines additionally require that the determination of major federal ac-
tions be made with a "view to the overall, cumulative impact of the action pro-
posed (and of future actions contemplated), ro sa Even in local actions, 187 the
CEQ requires a statement where there is potential for significant environmental
effect, and in every case where an action is highly controversial.' 88 The implica-
tion is that it would be advisable to prepare the statement in all actions likely
to have any environmental impact.
In Scherr v. Volpe489 the court concluded that, while federal agencies are
called upon to decide what the NEPA requires in certain situations, when such
a decision is challenged, it is for the court to construe the meanings of "major"
and "significantly affecting" and thereafter apply them to the action in ques-
177. Id. at 120 n.52.
178. Id. at 127.
179. Id.
180. 335 F. Supp. 1258 (D.N.M. 1971).
181. Id. at 1259.
182. Id. at 1260.
183. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1970).
184. 325 F. Supp. at 1260-61.
185. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
186. Id.
187. "Localized actions" are not dearly defined. However, it appears that the term is
designed to include individually small or insignificant actions which may have some environ-
mental effect, contribute cumulatively to an overall environmental problem or set a precedent
for potentially larger actions. See id.
188. Id.
189. 336 F. Supp. 886 (W. Wis. 1971).
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tion3s ° Conversion of twelve miles of highway from two to four lanes' -as
then deemed to be within the scope of the NEPA's mandate.' 2 It would appear
that the courts concur with the CEQ in their conclusion that nearly all actions
will require environmental statements in order to comply with both the letter
and the spirit of "the Congressional command to assemble the information ne-
cessary to an informed decision ..... 193
Following Calvert another question has developed with regard to environ-
mental statements. Assuming that they are required and that "environmental
issues [must] be considered at every important stage"'1 0 of a federal action,
the issue then becomes when must the statement be prepared. The guidelines
promulgated by the CEQ suggest that the answer is "[a]s early as possible and
in all cases prior to agency decision ... .,195 In Lathan v. Volpc61' the court
of appeals noted that the statement must obviously be prepared early in the
decisionmaking process.'0 7 Were the statement to be prepared only upon final
approval, as the defendants had advocated 1 8 "then it could well be too late to
adjust the formulated plans so as to minimize adverse environmental effects."'t
Upper Pecos Association v. StansP0 ° involved a grant of federal funds by the
Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce (EDA)
to the Forest Service for the construction of a highway in the Santa Fe National
Forest.2 0 While the court properly noted that "the project must be of sufficient
definiteness before an evaluation of its environmental impact can be made," -G
it would appear that it misconstrued the Act in holding that the environmental
statement was not required where the Forest Service had yet to approve the
final location and specific plans2 03 While both agencies had agreed that the pro-
posed highway constituted a major federal action,2 4 it is significant, as judge
Murrah noted in his dissenting opinion, that at no time did the EDA consider
the environmental impact of its grant.20 5 The NEPA expressly requires that "al
190. Id. at 888.
191. Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882, 884 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
192. 336 F. Supp. at 888-89.
193. Id. at 890; see 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). But see Citizens v. Laird, 3 Env. Rptr.-
Cases 1580 (D. Me. 1972), holding that a mock invasion by the Department of the Navy
would not require an environmental impact statement.
194. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 Fld 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
195. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
196. 3 Env. Rptr.-Cases 1362 (9th Cir. 1971).
197. Id. at 1368.
198. Id. While federal approval of the highway plans had not yet been given, authoriza-
tion for the acquisition of property had been granted. Id.
199. Id.
200. 452 F2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971).
201. Id. at 1235.
202. Id. at 1237.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1235.
205. Id. at 1239 (dissenting opinion).
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agencies... include.., a detailed statment ... ,,20 Since all agencies must
comply, it is difficult to justify the court's exempting the EDA. Moreover, it is
difficult to accept the EDA's contention that a project to which they had pre-
viously committed 3.8 million dollars20 7 was as yet too indefinite to require the
preparation of an impact statement.208 In any event, at that point the agency
action had been completed within the contemplation of the NEPA.2 0 D
VI. CONCLUSION
Calvert Cliffs' and subsequent decisions have shown that compliance with the
NEPA's procedural requirements will be strictly enforced. Nonetheless, because
the mandate is procedural, it can be argued that the Act affords less environ-
mental protection than would be desirable. "[D]ecision-making in a given
agency is required to meet certain procedural standards, yet the agency is left
in control of the substantive aspects of the decision.1 210 So long as the agency
involved has seriously considered environmental impact, the court will not in-
terject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of
the action to be taken.2 1'
Partially underlying this limited standard of review is the practical considera-
tion that, excepting the area of procedural fairness, the courts lack the technical
expertise to review such agency decisions.2 12 Conceding that the courts may not
be competent to subject the environmental statements issued to a more dis-
criminating standard than that of good faith, the alternative seems to be that the
206, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (1970) (emphasis added).
207. 452 F.2d at 1235.
208. Id. at 1236-37.
209. See text accompanying note 195 supra.
210. Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
See also Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
211. See Upper Pecos As'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971); National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D. Kan. 1971); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D. D.C. 1972). The initial problem in the
area is one of judicial review of agency action. See generally Berger, Administrative Arbltrari-
ness: A Synthesis, 78 Yale L.. 965 (1969) ; Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis
of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 367 (1968); Sive, Some Thoughts
of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev.
612 (1970). The recent trend in this area has been toward greater liberality. Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970). Applying this
principle where environmental factors are involved, the right to judicial review of agency
action or inaction has been widened in an attempt to secure the type of organized evaluation
which will be in the overall public interest. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,
428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
212. Recently the Supreme Court noted in an environmental action involving the pol-
lution of a river that "successful resolution would require primary skills of factfinding, con-
ciliation, detailed coordination with-and perhaps not infrequent deference to-other ad-
judicatory bodies, and dose supervision . . . .We have no claim to such expertise .... "
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971). See generally Saferstein, supra
note 203, at 382-83.
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responsibility for enforcing the protection of our nation's environment should
be placed elsewhere.
One solution would be to have this function performed under the auspices of
the Council on Environmental Quality.2 13 Not only is this independent body
composed of three members "exceptionally well qualified to analyze and inter-
pret environmental trends and information of all kinds,' - 14 but they are also
empowered to enlist the aid of a staff, including any experts and consultants,
to expedite the execution of their duties.2 15 The problem develops when one
considers the severe limitations inherent in CEQ's statutory powers. In essence,
the CEQ may assist the President in preparing his annual report- 10 and gather,
analyze and interpret current environmental information,217 including the de-
tailed statements prepared by federal agencies pursuant to section 102 of the
NEPA.218 Lacking is any regulatory authority in relation to the statements321
The CEQ apparently has power neither to require that a statement be prepared
and submitted nor to veto one which appears to be deficient.2 0 This is of sub-
stantive significance since the statement's primary function is to assure that
adequate environmental consideration has been given in all federal actions.22 1
One result of the CEQ's lack of authority has been the proliferation of actions
in the courts to force preparation of environmental statements. This is not to
say that none are being prepared. In fact, as of September 1, 1971 a total of
1,761 lengthy final and draft statements had been filed2m With an annual ap-
propriation of only one million dollars, -2-3 it is not difficult to see that in addition
to its other duties the sheer volume of statements makes a thorough CEQ
evaluation highly improbable. -2 2 4 The net effect is that the bulk of analysis and
213. The CEQ was created by the NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). See text accompanying
notes 77-80 supra.
214. Id.
215. Id. § 4343.
216. Id. § 4344(1).
217. Id. § 4344(2).
218. Id. § 4332(2) (C).
219. See Grad, supra note 4, § 13.01, at 13-30.
220. Id. at 13-20.
221. See note 142 supra and accompanying text
222. Comment, Section 309 of the Clean Air Act: EPA's Duty to Comment on Environ-
mental Impacts, 1 Env. L. Rptr. 10146, 10149 (1971).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 4347 (1970).
224. The Environmental Protection Agency functions in dose harmony with and to rein-
force the mission of the CEQ. Essentially the CEQ is an advisory group while the EPA is a
more operation or line oriented organization, charged with protecting the environment
through the abatement of pollution. "In short, the [CEQ] focuses on what our broad
policies in the environmental field should be; the EPA [focuses] on setting and enforcing
pollution control standards. The two are not competing, but complementary ... ." Message
from the President, 116 Cong. Rec. 23528, 23530 (1970). Thus, while the EPA does in a
sense assist the CEQ, the load of the CEQ is not lessened since it must still evaluate the
environmental statements submitted pursuant to section 102 of the NEPA, and also in
certain instances evaluate statements submitted under an EPA mandate. See note 174 supra.
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evaluation must be left to the interested agency and, when possible, to the
general public.225 While public scrutiny is highly desirable, the only recourse
at that point is to the courts, again raising the problem of judicial review.220
Rather than to defer these weighty problems to the procedural rubber stamp
of the courts, the CEQ should be given a more meaningful function within tho
framework of the NEPA. Not only must the CEQ be given regulatory power
over both the substance and procedure of environmental impact statements, but
the Council must also be given a budget which will be reasonably calculated to
provide the staff necessary to adequately review the environmental ramifications
of all federal actions. At this point the NEPA will become an even more effec-
tive tool in man's effort to improve his environment.
225. The NEPA also requires public disclosure of the statements. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)
(1970). A discussion of some of the problems which have been encountered in this respect
may be found in Grad, supra note 4, § 13.01, at 13-31 to -33.
226. See text accompanying notes 210-15 supra.
